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SUBJECTIVITY VS. USE: A
HEIDEGGERIAN CRmQUE OF SARTREAN
VALUES

Laura M. Bruce
Denison University
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming of ethical theory has
been its various attempts to use some sort of metaphysical
entity or some conception of "human nature" to establish an
absolute, universal ground. Jean-Paul Sartre stands out in the
existentialist tradition as having made vigorous claims against
both of these"grounds." Yet, Sartre' s analysis of human reality
does not resolve the problem of grounding ethics; instead, he
claims that each individual, through subjective choosing and
concrete action, creates value. In some sense, this view still
leads to a grounding of sorts: value is possible only on the basis
of subjectivity, for, liTo choose between this or that is at the
same time to affirm the value of that which is chosen.lfl Sartre' s
solution to the problem of absolute ethical universals comes at
the expense of shared, public values-for him, all valuing is
relative to the individual. According to such a theory, Fyodor
Dostoevsky's claim that "If God did not exist, everything
would be permitted" is correct, as Sartre readily admits.
My contention in this paper is that a rejection of ethical
absolutes does not inevitably lead to Sartrean relativism, nor
does it deny the existence of values. Despite Dostoevsky's and
Sartre's claims, our ordinary experience of values and ethical
decision-making arises through shared public practices. Sartre
claims to be doing phenomenology, which should account for
our ordinary experiences. However, once he has introduced
subjectivity, an account of ordinary experience is impossible, as
all human practices are possible only on the basis of subjectiv
ity. In order to seek out ethics in its original home-that is,
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where we originally experience value-it is necessary that the
shared practices of ordinary experience be accounted for. It is
the task of this paper to show:
I) how Sartre uses a traditional subject I object distinc

tion in his investigation of consciousness and why it
leads to the conclusion that subjectivity is the source
of value;

II) how Martin Heidegger's phenomenological ac

count of Dasein affords a criticism of Sartre's ontol
ogy and accounts for shared practices; and

III) how such a critique avoids the Sartrean relativism
regarding values and where it leads us instead.

I aim to show that the type of relativism that Sartre con
cludes with isolates values from the world, and that this is
impossible, because values are social.
I

I wi1l now offer a brief exposition of Sartre's account of
consciousness to show that it is dependent upon a traditional
subject! object distinction and that it inevitably leads to ethical
relativism. Because Sartre is doing phenomenology in the
tradition of Husserl, all he has to begin with are objects as they
are revealed to us. Sartre's preliminary examination shows
that part of the phenomenal condition of objects is that they are
revealed to something. Thus, Sartre's examination first refers
us to a "knower," a being which knows or "reveals" objects as
what they are.
In the first place, Sartre claims that an account of being
cannot reduce "being to the knowledge which we have of it,"
as idealism has done, nor can it take knowledge as a given, as
realism has done. 2 He rejects these methods because knowl
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edge itself caIU10t account for being. To talk of knowing is to
presuppose existence, or at least the existence of a knower. No
account of knowledge can be fruitful without an account of this
knower. This knower refers us to the basis for knowledge-the
being of the knower-which Sartre calls "consciousness":
The law of being in the knowing subject is to-be
conscious. Consciousness is not a mode of particular
knowledge which may be called an inner meaning or
self-knowledge; it is the dimension of
transphenomenal being in the subject.... It is in itself
something other than a knowledge turned back upon
itself. 3

Sartre takes from Husserl his fundamental characteriza
tion of consciousness, that is, "All consciousness is conscious
ness of something."4 As such, consciousness is intentional, as a
directional activity toward some thing outside of conscious
ness. However, consciousness is contingent upon the neces
sary and ,sufficient condition that it also be consciousness of
itself.~ In oHler words, "consciousness is directly an awareness
of ~;omething other than itself and simultaneously and indi
rectly an awareness of itself."I)
Ye t, a consciousness thatis directed outward establishes
at once a connection between itself and the world. In his
preliminary examination of consciousness, Smtre provides an
ontological proof that shows that consciousness is "born sup
ported by a being which is not itsel£."7 As a "revealing intuition,"
consciousness is by virtue of the fact that it can reveal some
thing outside itself. We need not examine consciousness itself
to determine what it "knows" oHhe world-revealing a "world/
is precisely what consciousness is as a spontaneous activity
directed outward. This intentional characteristic requires that
the object not be a thing residing in consciousness, for con
sciollsness is a "positional consciousness of the world."11 As
such, consciousness establishes a world of entities outside of it
which are not it and therefore must have their own being:
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Sartre wishes to keep a delicate balance-insisting
that consciousness is intentional and therefore neces
sarily related to an object other than itself, and yet
insisting that the being of consciousness and the
being of the thing known are not reducible to the
consciousness-of-the-object.9

Consciousness is, for Sartre, a "nonsubstantial abso
lute": consciousness is never relative to the object known, and
therefore, is absolute; and consciousness is just pure revelation
of a being, without self-identity, and therefore, is
nonsubstantiaVo hl fact, it is precisely because consciousness
is fundamentally a lack that it can never have the self-identity
and fullness of being that is characteristic of objects. By virtue
of this lack, which Sartre calls nothingness/' consciousness is
perfectly translucent-a contentless revealing of something
which it is not. Nothingness lies at the heart of consciousness
and distinguishes human reality from the being of things.
Hence the two divisions of being which title his work: Being
and Nothingness. While this distinction appears radical, a
closer look reveals that it is reminiscent of the Cartesian
subject) object model, in that consciousness is a subject iso
lated from objects which it "knows." The traditional subject)
object distinction, which Sartre employs from the start, ob
scures his account of ethics.
In the end, Sartre shows that what makes possible
consciousness' yaluing of entities, actions, situations and the
world is this fundamental nothingness. At the heart of human
reality is nothing, and surrounding it on all sides is facticity
situation. 11 Lacking all identity and content, human reality is
completely free; it is freedom. Yet, it is not free to be its own
foundation: it is abandoned in a factical world to create itself,
therefore existence precedes essence." Only on the basis of its
fundamental nothingness can human reality establish an "es
sence," be free to make choices, posit value, or know the world:
"Human-reality everywhere encounters resistance and ob
stacles which it has not created, but these resistances and
/I
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obstacles have meaning only in and through the free choice
which human-reality is.''12 Only a beingwhichhasnothlngness
at its core is free to create value, but objects are being tl11'ough
and through. Ethical values then, are not to be found within the
world of "things" ; this realm of being is completely dependent
on free consciousness for its ethical significance:
...we have neither behind us, nor before us in a lumi
nous realm of values, any means of justification or
excuse. We are left alone, without excuse. That is
what I mean when I say that man is condemned to be
free. Condemned, because he did not create himself,
yet is nevertheless at liberty, and from the moment
that he is thrown into this world he is responsible for
everything he doesP

The force of this claim sets in later when Sartre says: every
man, without any support or help whatever, is condemned at
every instant to invent man./l14 Every individual is responsible
for creating both him/herself and humanity, yet individual
choices cannot be helped by "Man"-they must be created by
each individual. Values are grounded on the concrete "noth
ing" of each subjectivity as it chooses and actively creates itself:
"You are free, therefore choose-that is to say, invent. No lUle
of general morality can show you what you ought to do; no
signs are vouchsafed in this world. illS The ability to choose and
act, and thereby "invent" values is only possible on the basis of
free consciousness. Therefore, all values are relative to each
individual and arise in the world only when this individual
chooses and acts in concrete situations.
/I

II

We have seen that the foundation for Sartre's account of
consciousness is the distinction between subjects and objects. I
will now offer a Heideggerian critique of this distinction to
show that it produces a distorted view of how human beings
experience the world and leads to the untenable conclusion of
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ethical relativism.
Sartre begins by investigating the way objects are re
vealed to consciousness. This method leads him to claim that
consciousness, as the activity of revealing objects, is the essen
tial way humans experience the world. Heidegger rejects this
sort of account of human experience and points to the subject /
object model as the source of confusion: "It in the ontology of
Dasein, we'take our departure' from a worldless 'I' in order to
provide this 'I' with an object and an ontologically baseless
relation to that object, then we have 'presupposed' not too
much, but too little."16 For Heidegger, the subject/ object model
presupposes "too little" because it only accounts for one way
of experiencing the world.
In an attempt to avoid Cartesian talk of subjects and
objects altogether, Heidegger begins his account with "Dasein./I
Dasein is just each one of us-individual human beings. In
contrast to Sartre's reworking of the Cartesian subject, Dasein
is not a "self-sufficient source of all meaning and intelligibil
ity."17 Rather, Dasein designates the human way of being.
According to Heidegger, the subject/ object model, like that
employed by Sartre, fails to account for Dasein's ordinary way
of being by skipping over what is closest to Dasein-its "aver
age everydayness."
Heidegger's account of average everydayness shows
that Dasein's ordinary experience neither rests on nor reveals
anything like "subjects" or " objects."18 The "world" is that
which Dasein first encounters in its average everydayness: the
"environment" and those things Dasein uses in the environ
ment. 19 Dasein's ordinary experience is not one of reflecting on
or knowing the environment, but a "concernful" dealing with
and use of things in the environment:
... the kind ofbeing which belongs to such concemful
dealings is not one into which we need to put our
selves first. This is the way in which everyday Dasein
always is: when I open the door, for instance, I use the
doorknob. 20 .
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While Sartre follows Descartes by describing objects as they
lie before a subject who grasps them cognitively, for Heidegger,
objects are not things we ordinarily need to Ifget to." They are
"ready-to-hand" as those things right here that we are using,
and in use, that we are not reflecting on. In use, they withdraw
as objects. Ordinarily, they are always ready-to-hand for us:
when I rush out the door in the morning, the car is ready to be
used, and instead of looking at it and thinking about getting
into it, I jump in, turn the key and speed away. On Sartre's
account, the car is primarily what Heidegger calls "present-at
hand"-itis an object which I know because I behold the car qua
car. By taking the car as essentially present-at-hand, Sartre fails
to account for the fact that ordinarily, I do not need to reflect on
the car-I just use it.
Although the practices of everyday experience may
refer us to a user, an examination of a user does not require an
examination of the user's consciousness. This is because a
phenomenological account of use does not prompt us to sup
pose that things which are ready-to-hand are atbottom present
at-hand. In everyday experience an object is not, strictly
speaking, encountered at all. Instead, ready-to-hand things are
just what get llsed and produced as a means of accomplishing
some goal with whichDaseinisconcerned. A description of the
way Dasein ordinarily uses things dispels the notion of objects
as "reflected on"; "the perceiving of what is known is not a
process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of con
sciousness after one has gone out and grasped it.H21 But for
Sartre, this is exactly what experience is, as his descriptions of
consciousness in the introduction to Being and Nothingness
show: "Consciousness is ... the dimension of transphenomenal
being in the subject;" All consciousness is positional in th.at it
transcends itself in order to reach an object;" "All that there is
of intention in my actual consciousness is directed toward the
outside;" and "The perceived being is before consciousness;
consciousness can not reach it, and it can not enter into con
sciousness."22 Sal"tre's subject / object model precludes a strict
phenomenological account, which reveals instead that when
"we carefully describe everyday ... activity [we] do not find
II
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any mental states" --i.e., any "beholding" or "knowing."23
Heidegger's phenomenological method has critical con
sequences for the Sartrean model of subjectivity precisely be
cause he shows that knowing is not part of our everyday
experiences. Dasein's ordinary experience is not a "knowing"
experience, but a useful involvement with other entities in the
world. Therefore Sartre' S account of subjects and objects cannot
stand alone; it must be based on a prior phenomenological
description of use. Using things is primary to Dasein' s ordinary
experience: "what is revealed by use is ontologically more
fundamental than the substances with determinate, context
free properties revealed by detached contemplation."24 It is
only upon use that we speak of subjects and objects. It is a
"breakdown" of this average everyday use that puts Dasein in
a position of reflecting on an object. When I jump into the car
and, two miles down the road, it breaks down, I am forced to
reflect on it as present-at-hand. It is no longer something that
goes along with me in my use; instead, I get out of the car, kick
it and stare at it. It is just the object: "car./I But, ordinarily, I do
not reflect on the car qua car at all. According to Sartre,
reflecting on objects is primary, and ordinary use must be
established. Therefore, his account distorts ordinary human
experience. What for Heidegger is a secondary and derivative
experience of the world is for Sartre the ontological basis of
human reality.
Dasein's everyday use and involvements are the back
ground upon which Sartre's subject! object distinction is pos
sible. Prior to "knowing" this world, Dasein is already familiar
with this world, already using things, already interpreting itself
and this world, and already having a way of being. This means
that Dasein has not in and of itself established practices, ac
quired understanding, posited uses, or intended meanings for
things. These things are not experienced as the product of one's
consciousness, but they arise out of a context of shared, public
practices. No individual object ever shows up in the wodd as
it is in and of itself, but always is in terms of its belonging to
other equipment" in a context,25 Dasein does not ordinarily
/I
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behold this context as a situation which lies before it. Rather,
Dasein dwells in this context in a familiar a~d involved way,
which Heidegger calls Being-in-the-world. Ordinarily, Dasein
uses things in a context with which it already familiar, in
whichthe things are used in order to do something. To say that
the subject/ object distinction is only possible due to a break
down of everyday use is also to say that a context of shared,
public practices, which makes use possible, is ontologically
prior.
Yet, Sartre has not failed altogether to address the im
portance of a worldly context. Once he has abstracted subject
and object in order to analyze them, he establishes that they
form a totality of flbeing-in-the-world" which "has a real
priority over its conceptually distinct parts."26 Sartre claims:
In truth the cogito must be our point of departure, but
we can say of it, parodying a famous saying, that it
leads us only on condition that we get out of it. Our
preceding study ... had as its goal only to place us in
a position to question the cogito about its being and to
furnish llS with the dialectic instrument which would
enable us to find in the cogito itself the means of
escaping from instantaneity toward the totality of
. being which constitutes human reality.27

The trouble, for Sartre, is that being-in-the-world needs to
be established: liThe scandal of philosophy' is not that this
proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and
attempted again and again. .. If Dasein is understood correctly,
it defies such proofs, because, in its Beulg, it already is what
subsequent proofs deem necessary to demonstrate for it."28 For
Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is onto logically prior and can
not be divided into two radically separated regions ofbeing,"
where a relation between subject and object must be estab
lished: 29
I

/I

When Dasein directs itself towards something and
grasps it, it does not somehow first get out of an hmer
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sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated,
but its primary kind of Being is such that it is always
'outside' alongside entities which it encounters and which
belong to a world already discovered .30
As soon as the subject / object model is assumed by Sartre,
human reality is abstracted from any public, worldly context.
The Sartrean claim that later, contextual experience can be
constructed and explained as a "totality of su bjects and objects/'
is precisely the theoretical distortion of human reality that
results from the Cartesian modeL This is because,
In no case is a Dasein, untouched and unseduced by
this way in which things have been interpreted, set
before the open country of a 'world-in-itself' so that it
just beholds what it encounters. The dominance of
the public way in which things have been interpreted
has already been decisi ve even for the possibilities of
having a mood-that is, for the basic way in which
Dasein lets the world 'matter' to itPl
Since Sartre needs to establish being-in-the-world, he
also needs to establish the meanings and values enc()un tercd in
ordinary experience. He establishes them as the products of
subjectivity: "every man, without any support or help whatever, is
condemned at every instant to invent man."32 The ontological
gap between subject and worldly context is what allows Smtre
to claim that "Consciousness is not a being but the activity
whereby a human being recasts an impersonal universe in the
form of the human life world.// 33 Where consciousness is the
foundation of all experience, meanings and values are all
relative to the intentional projects of individuals-finally m.ak~
ing public, shared meanings and values impossihle. This
overlooks the fact that values can only arise out of practices and
uses which are public and which Dasein is all'eady involved in.
There is already a context of practices which makes use pos~
sible-and it is because Dasein uses things within this context
that meanings and values arise. Dasein is never in a position to
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"create" the world ex nihilo, for this world and Dasein's expe
riences in it are not "impersonal," but are always already
meaningful.

III
These ordinary experiences are always already mean
ingful because the context in which they are carried out is a
public one. Because this context has ontological priority over
consciousness, Dasein is not involved in practices and uses in
isolation, but always with Others. This is not to say that Dasein
has "knowledge" of Others as "subjects" which are encoun
tered. It is only when there is a breakdown of ordinary public
practices that Others show up as "subjects" for Dasein. Ordi
narily, Others are experienced as those with whom Dasein is
coping and involved. Through this public sphere of everyday
activity, Daseinhas always already been interpreted by Others,
existed for Others and been with Others. In everyday experi
ence, Dasein is absorbed in the world in such a way that it is
indistinguishable from Others. Dasein's involvement in the
world is no t distinct: Dasein is depressed as "one" is depressed,
talks a~ "one" talks, judges as "one" judges and behaves as
"one" behaves.:14 In everyday activities, Dasein' s involvements
in the world are taken on as "one" takes them on.
The public realm of the"one" dictates those norms by
which every aspect of social life is organized. Dasein has
always already taken on specific norms in a specific context and
understood them. However, public practices occur in many
different contexts and have many different meanings-what
the "one" says in one context may very well be the exact
opposite of what the"one" says in another context. It is notthat
Dasein in each case does exactly what the"one" says-Dasein
may also reject what the"one" does, modify what the"one"
says, or ignore what the "one" thinks, etc. However, it is only
on the basis of the established, understood norms which Dasein
has already taken on that such modification occurs. Values
arise through the public practices engaged in by Dasein with
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others. It is because of the public context of the "one" that there
are practices, and it is only because there are practices that
there are values.
Dasein's ethical decision-making, which includes vari
ous sorts of activities-weighing consequences, following and
rejecting ethical principles, compromising differences, etc.-is
always carried outwithin a context and upon the background
of established ethical practices. These public practices are not
something which Dasein must first get "into" and then some
times gets "out" of. Sartre's notion that valuing things or
making ethical decisions are activities which are done"subjec
tively," and, as it were, "privately," entirely misconstrues the
nature of what it is to do these things. If we carry our
Heideggerian critique of Sartre through to the end, the conclu
sion we reach is that values are not grounded in subjectivity
pure subjectivity is the result of breakdown, which occurs on
an always already established background of public contexts
and practices. What is primary is the context: we cannot
remove ethics from its public context and expect to show that
individuals, through subjective positing, establish" value in
the world. Hence, values and ethical decision-making are
things which Dasein is already familiar with in its everyday
coping with others. Dasein becomes familiar with them as it
'sees' them at work and uses them. We could say then, that
following an ethics, upholding a value, or making an ethical
decision consists in going by a "sign-post," a principle, which
is customary, familiar and already undeI'stood. 35
This is not to say that situations of ethical detachment
do not occur, but that they are analogous to beholding an object
as present-at-hand. Situations in which we pull back from OUI'
ordinary involvement and say "what do I do now?" are situa
tions of ethical breakdown. Such a stance is possible only
because in ordinary practice, we use values and make ethical
decisions all the time without placing the situation before us as
present-at-hand. In ordinary experience, I do not pull back
from my everyday affaiI's with others and ask myself if I
should kill them or not-the question never arises. In every
1/
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day practice I just don't do it, thereby upholding something
which is valuable within the context and practices that I dwell
in.
While such an accotmt of public practices shows that
values cannot be grounded in subjectivity, neither are they
grounded in the objective world: there is value only because
there are public practices. This does not mean that values are
grounded in the world, but that they are groundless, based
only on ongoing, changing and multiple human practices and
contexts, Public practices are all that constitute the values
which Dasein copes with, but these practices themselves are
grounded in nothing. Hubert Dreyfus points out the signifi
cance of the Heideggerian stance:
Traditionally all meanings have been traced back to
some final self-intelligible, most real, occurrent source,
e.g. the Good, God, or the transcendental ego. The
oneil as ultimate reality ... a philosophical version of
God-cannot supply this sort of intelligibility, It can
never be made completely explicit and justified. It
. contains an understanding of being and accounts for
all intelligibility, yet it is no sort of intelligible thing at
all. 3(,
1/

The lack of intelligibility in the publicness of the "oneil is
just its groundlessness. While the public sphere of the one" is
always already given, and provides the background of intelli
gibility and meaning for Dasein's everyday practices, it is not
a foundation beneath these practices. The oneil is constituted
by nothing more than these ordinary practices and it is only
because there are ordinary practices that Dasein understands
meaning and value. As a particular way of taking up these
public practices, ethics can only "occur" as the human en
deavor to best "put to use" the meanings and values which are
always already there,·
Therefore, what is at issue is ethical theory -if values
are not grounded in subjectivity or the world itself, nor in some
transcendent Being, we reach a point where there is no funda
/I
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mental justification for values, no absolute ground. The desire
to construct an ethical theory is itself based on the precepts that
there is a foundation upon which such theory can be built, and
that we need only to "tease out" this foundation from everyday
experience. Since uses and practices are themselves grounded
on nothing, but always already there, there is nothing for
theOlY to stand on. The attempt to find absolute justifications
for right and wrong is precisely the attempt to take ethics out
of practice and make it conform to a theoretical system.
This does not mean that all values must be equally
respected or are equally meaningful for everyone, however.
Dasein is always already in a specific environment, culture and
historyr involved in specific practices and uses. Claims which
favor cultural relativism are based on the mistaken supposition
that getting out of all contexts and practices of ethical valuation
is possible. But to be indifferent to one sort of context or practice
of valuing is only to accept another, however rudimentary.
Likewise, to acrept some value is to reject others. In no case can
one be indifferent to or accepting of all possible contexts and
practices of valuing. This is because "Being-in is not a 'prop
erty' which D asein sometimes has and sometimes does not
have, and without which it could be just as well as it could with
it. Itisnotthe case that man 'is' and then has, by way of an extra,
a relationship-of-Being towards the 'world'-a world which he
provides himself with occasionally."37 What counts as valuable
or ethicallnay be relative to a specific context of practices, but
is never relative to an individual. But to say that values are
relative to a certain culture, forinstance, is only to say that there
are many public practices employed by many different groups
and that the values that arise out of these practices are ethical
for them. It is 011 the basis of what they hold ethical that they see
the practices and values of other groups as unethical. It is their
own practices and uses of values that allow them to say with
conviction that child abuse is wrong," or "racism is unethi
caV'
In no way can Dasein shed its Being-in-the-world so as
to "view" all values from a context-free perspective. It is
/I
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precisely because we do have public practices that there is
anything like value or ways of taking up these practices ethi
cally. It is because Dasein in each case engages in particular
practices in particular public contexts that Dasein always has a
particular way of taking up these practices ethically. Dasein's
everyday experience of values is not such that all values are
experienced on an equal plane. To say that there is no "true"
value if our ethical valuations calUl.ot be absolutely justified
by God, by Dasein or by the world-is still to suppose that
without foundation, values CalUl.ot exist. Yet, in everyday
practice and coping, values are experienced. Despite the lack of
a single absolute, universal ground, Dasein does use values;
and in Dasein' s ordinary experience, everything is not permit
ted.
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